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INTRODUCTION
In Liriano v. Hobart Corp.,I the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit announced and applied a legal duty that has
stirred considerable controversy. This Note argues that while Liriano
III gets high marks for theoretical subtlety, the lawlessness of its practi-
cal implications deserves scrutiny. Although Judge Calabresi's deci-
sion on first reading appears to violate traditional elements of the
products liability doctrine of failure-to-warn, upon closer inspection it
emerges as a subtle, sophisticated treatment of that doctrine. These
subtleties carry positive weight. Nevertheless, Liriano IIls very sophis-
tication effectively threatens to undermine reasonable, practical limi-
tations on liability for failure-to-warn. On balance, the negatives of
Judge Calabresi's decision outweigh the positives. Courts should thus
be wary to build on the conceptual platform Liriano III appears to
provide.
In arguing that the theoretical subtlety of Liriano III carries unac-
ceptable practical consequences, I am not suggesting that doctrinal
subtlety is necessarily problematic. Legal doctrine can be subtle in
ways that serve useful ends. Indeed, the nuanced complexity of the
law is often both a theoretical and practical virtue. Subtlety is a theo-
retical virtue insofar as it helps achieve a more complete and rational
understanding of the law. Judges and legal scholars often explore the
limits of legal theory, testing the logic and coherence of the law.
1 170 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Liriano III].
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Through law review articles, and even classroom hypotheticals, legal
scholarship clarifies and occasionally adjusts the boundaries of various
legal doctrines. Ideally, the result over time is an increasingly valid
and sound, and typically more subtle and nuanced, set of legal theo-
rems. Subtlety is a practical virtue insofar as it aids courts in adjudicat-
ing the astounding variety of real-world problems they face. Carefully
crafted, widely applicable legal rules are needed for this task. The
common law aims to produce a body of doctrine sensitive to the vagar-
ies of life that classroom hypotheticals may imitate, but can never en-
tirely capture. Of course, both theory and practice are important
stimuli in the formulation of legal doctrine, and, as a result of their
interplay, the law displays a sophisticated texture and functional sub-
tlety that, we hope, serve the ultimate practical goal of facilitating the
fair and efficient resolution of the real disputes of actual people.
Consonant with the notion that the ultimate purpose of a body of
subtle jurisprudence is practical, practical considerations may limit
just how subtle that law can and should be. Good judicial decision
making is as important as good scholarship in the crafting of sensible
legal rules. Intelligent, informed judges must appropriately apply
complex legal doctrine. Moreover, unlike law professors,judges' deci-
sions more directly impact the lives of those before them, as well as
the lives of those who will become subject to precedent set. Thus,
even theoretically sophisticated judges need to be somewhat circum-
spect in what they do and to whom they do it. Unfortunately, sophisti-
cated judges sometimes inadequately temper exercises in theoretical
sophistication with important practical considerations. The result can
be a theoretical and practical mess. What can courts do to avoid the
mess? An underlying theme of this Note is that judges should resist
the urge to sacrifice common sense on the altar of theory. They can
accomplish this feat by focusing on the following tasks: (1) hesitating
to announce the existence of duties, even ones that pass threshold
theoretical tests, when those duties make good sense only in carefully
imagined hypotheticals; (2) taking care to assign such speculative du-
ties to defendants on only clearly appropriate facts; and (3) taking
seriously, once they have announced and assigned theoretically subtle
duties, their ability to decide questions of proximate causation as a
matter of law.
Liriano III marked the end of a series of litigation involving certi-
fied questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit to the New York Court of Appeals, the answers from the New
York Court of Appeals, and the Second Circuit's decision. Both the
New York court and the Second Circuit, each in its own way, violated
one or more of the admonitions outlined above. Part I of this Note
offers a preliminary discussion of failure-to-warn doctrine, outlines the
[Vol. 88:814
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facts and holdings of the Liriano case law, and discusses some criti-
cisms of that case. Part II first explains that the duty to warn is per-
haps more subtle than it first appears. This Part then outlines a more
recent Second Circuit decision, Burke v. Spartanics Ltd.,2 that seems to
be in tension with the federal court's holding in Liriano IlL Finally,
this Part argues that considerations of doctrinal subtlety demonstrate
that Judge Calabresi's decision in Liriano III is theoretically coherent;
it is consistent with Burke, and at least some of its critics have misun-
derstood its reasoning. Part III nevertheless maintains that Liriano
II's formal coherence in no way implies its practical acceptability.
The New York Court of Appeals and the Second Circuit have created a
lawless failure-to-warn jurisprudence through their joint efforts at an-
nouncing, assigning, and failing to place practical limits on a duty that
is as subtle as any.
I
LIRANo V. HOBART CORP.: AN EXPANSION OF THE Dumy
TO WARN?
In 1999, the Second Circuit issued an opinion that seemed to
defy traditional principles of failure-to-warn jurisprudence. Commen-
tators argue that, in Liriano 111,3 the Second Circuit deviated from
traditional products liability principles in the following three ways:
first, the court adopted the functional equivalent of a "heeding pre-
sumption," removing from the plaintiff the burden of proving causa-
tion; second, the court seemed to abrogate the traditional rule in
failure-to-warn cases that manufacturers have no duty to warn of open-
and-obvious dangers; and finally, the court bolstered its expansion of
the duty to warn by misapplying the concept of "informed choice."
4
This Note focuses primarily on the second and third of these criti-
cisms. In order to begin evaluating Liriano IIL's treatment of failure to
warn, a preliminary sketch of the doctrine itself is, necessary.
A. A First Pass at Failure to Warn
During the latter half of the twentieth century, three distinct ba-
ses of products liability emerged. Namely, courts have held that man-
ufacturers and distributors are liable for harm proximately caused by
products with manufacturing defects, 5 defectively designed products,6
2 252 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2001).
3 170 F.3d 264.
4 See generally Hildy Bowbeer & David S. Killoran, Liriano v. Hobart Corp.: Obvious
Dangers, the Duty to Warn of Safer Alternatives, and the Heeding Presumption, 65 BROOK. L. REv.
717 (1999) (arguing that these doctrinal deviations unjustifiably expanded the scope of
liability for failure to warn).
5 See, e.g., Myrlak v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 723 A.2d 45, 51-52 (N.J. 1999).
6 See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962).
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and products for which the manufacturer or distributor provided in-
adequate instructions or warnings.7 Courts and commentators com-
monly refer to the third basis of liability as the "failure-to-warn"
doctrine.8
1. Basic Warnings Doctrine
Failure-to-warn is, broadly speaking, a doctrine under which
product manufacturers and distributors have a duty to provide infor-
mation to users and consumers about risks related to product use or
consumption. If a product manufacturer or distributor fails to pro-
vide reasonable warnings or instructions that could reduce foresee-
able risks related to the use or consumption of its product, courts will
deem the product "defective" and hold the manufacturer or distribu-
tor liable for harm that the product causes. 9 Failure-to-warn and de-
fective design claims differ from claims of manufacturing defect in at
least two ways. First, when a plaintiff claims that a product with a man-
ufacturing defect caused her harm, she is claiming the product
mechanically departed from the manufacturer's intended design, and
that this departure proximately caused her harm.1" When a plaintiff
claims that a product is defective due to a lack of adequate warnings
or is defective in design, however, she is claiming that the product
reached her with precisely the warnings and design that the manufac-
turer intended, but that the intended warnings and design are them-
selves defective. 1  That is, in failure to warn and design defect cases,
the plaintiff is impugning the manufacturer's conscious choices.
Second, whereas manufacturers and distributors are strictly liable
for harm caused by manufacturing defects, warning and design claims
7 See, e.g., Liriano III, 170 F.3d at 269-71.
8 See id. at 266; James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in
Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 265, 267 (1990).
9 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 (1998) [hereinafter RESTATE-
MENT]. According to the Restatement,
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it contains a
manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of inad-
equate instructions or warnings. A product...
(c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when
the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been re-
duced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by
the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of
distribution, and the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the
product not reasonably safe.
Id. § 2(c).
10 See RESTATEMENT § 2 cmt. c.
11 See, e.g., Urena v. Biro Mfg. Co., 114 F.3d 359, 363 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Design de-
fects, . . . unlike manufacturing defects, involve products made in the precise manner
intended by the manufacturer.").
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are generally claims of negligence. 12 Some courts resist the notion
that negligence doctrine plays a role in warning and design claims-
taking quite seriously the notion that all three bases of products liabil-
ity are "strict."'13 It should not be surprising, however, that negligence
is at the root of warning and design claims. After all, true strict liabil-
ity is a no-fault proposition, and a claim that an intended warning (or
lack thereof) is inadequate, or that an intended design is unreasona-
bly dangerous, necessarily implies that the manufacturer did some-
thing wrong.
2. Two Purposes Served by Failure to Warn
The duty to warn or instruct-the duty to provide information to
users and consumers about the use or consumption of products-
serves two purposes. First, warnings and instructions inform users and
consumers how to reduce risks inherent in using or consuming a par-
ticular product. 14 Commentators refer to this purpose as the "risk-
reduction" function of warnings and instructions.' 5 Once an individ-
ual has decided to use or consume a product, risk-reduction informa-
tion aids the individual in using or consuming the product more
safely than she otherwise might.'
6
When a court evaluates whether to hold a defendant liable for
failing to provide risk-reduction information, causation is a central is-
sue. Indeed, if a plaintiff claims that the absence or inadequacy of a
warning was the reason she suffered harm, and the court is primarily
concerned with how the product manufacturer could have helped the
plaintiff use the product more safely to avoid that harm, then the
plaintiff must prove that an adequate warning would have, in fact, pre-
vented the harm she suffered. Thus, as in negligence actions, the
plaintiff must establish not only that the defendant owed and
12 See RESTATEMENT § 2 cmt. a.
In general, the rationale for imposing strict liability on manufacturers for
harm caused by manufacturing defects does not apply in the context of
imposing liability for defective design and defects based on inadequate in-
struction or warning .... [Thus, the provisions for design and warning-
based liability] speak of products being defective only when risks are rea-
sonably foreseeable.
Id.
13 See, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 549 (N.J. 1982)
(holding that a jury may find a product manufacturer liable for failure to warn of risks
unknowable at the time of distribution).
14 See, e.g., Urena, 114 F.3d at 365 (holding that the plaintiff had presented sufficient
evidence to withstand summary judgment by showing that, had the manufacturer of a
meat-saw provided warnings and instructions regarding the use of a "safety plate" to push
meat across the blade, the plaintiff could have used the saw more safely).
15 See, e.g., Henderson & Twerski, supra note 8, at 285-89.
16 See id. at 285.
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breached a duty to the plaintiff, but also that but for the defendant's
breach, the plaintiff would not have suffered harm. 17
Some courts have held that risk reduction is not the only function
served by requiring a product manufacturer to warn and instruct users
and consumers.18 Warnings and instructions not only inform consum-
ers as to how to use or consume a product more safely, but also pro-
vide consumers with information from which to decide whether to use
or consume the product at all.' 9 Although this second purpose also
serves to reduce risk,2° courts and commentators refer to it as the "in-
formed-choice" function of warnings and instructions. 21 The distinc-
tion between the risk-reduction and informed-choice functions has
important practical implications. Informed-choice warnings may
serve a purpose where product use entails "nonreducible" risks-risks
for which a warning could not inform a user or consumer how to use or
consume the product more safely. 22 Thus, where a risk-reduction
warning would do no good, a court still might hold a product manu-
facturer liable for failing to provide an informed-choice warning.
Although informed-choice warnings do serve to reduce risk, inso-
far as they convey information upon which a product user or con-
sumer might decide not to use or consume a potentially dangerous
product, courts applying informed-choice theory tend to do so not to
reduce risk, but rather to protect the plaintiffs sense of personal dig-
nity. Courts that impose informed-choice duties seem to focus less on
what the presence of a warning would or would not have actually ac-
complished, and more on the idea that such a warning would simply
have provided the plaintiff with a choice. In an early use of informed-
17 See, e.g., Walsh v. Hayward Indus. Prods., No. 00-7985, 2001 WL 303754, at *1 (2d
Cir. Mar. 28, 2001) (applying New York law and affirming summary judgment for defen-
dant valve manufacturer because plaintiff "failed to produce evidence ... that a warning
would have prevented his injury").
18 See, e.g., Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 129-31 (9th Cir. 1968) (holding
that polio vaccine manufacturer could be liable for failing to inform users of a remote risk
that the users could do nothing to reduce).
19 See, e.g., Aaron D. Twerski et al., The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability-
Design Defect Liability Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 495, 513-14 (1976) ("Some warnings
are merely informative in nature. They do not permit the consumer to reduce his expo-
sure to risk if he uses the product; they merely tell him that a risk inheres in the product
and that he has the option to take it or leave it.").
20 A product user who decides not to use a given product necessarily eliminates the
chances of incurring risks inherent in that product's use.
21 See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5th Cir.
1973); Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d at 129-30;JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSK,
PRODucTs LIABILIrrv: PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 337 (4th ed. 2000) ("Instructions and warn-
ings serve two functions: They reduce risks of harm, and they enable users and consumers
to make informed decisions regarding whether to encounter risks that cannot be elimi-
nated by careful use and consumption."); Henderson & Twerski, supra note 8, at 285; Twer-
ski et al., supra note 19, at 517-21.
22 See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 8, at 285 n.88.
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choice theory, for example, the court in Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod-
ucts Corp. explained that
the user or consumer is entitled to make his own choice as to
whether the product's utility or benefits justify exposing himself to
the risk of harm. Thus, a true choice situation arises, and a duty to
warn attaches, whenever a reasonable man would want to be in-
formed of the risk in order to decide whether to expose himself to
it.
2 3
Given this choice, the plaintiff may or may not heed the warning;
whether she would is less important than whether she is given the
opportunity to choose.
With the driving concern behind imposing a duty to provide in-
formed-choice warnings or instructions being not to ensure that po-
tential product users will necessarily heed that information, but rather
to treat such potential users with dignity, courts can perhaps worry less
about the issue of causation. Professors Henderson and Twerski have
suggested as much, noting that so-called "heeding presumptions"-
whereby courts shift the burden of proving causation from the plain-
tiff to the defendant-might well be more justified in informed-choice
cases than in risk-reduction cases. 24 Indeed, courts that entertain in-
formed-choice theory do seem to view foreseeability and causation as
less important than do courts concerned with the more traditional
function of risk-reduction.
In Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., the plaintiff argued that the
manufacturer of a polio vaccine used in mass-immunization clinics
should have provided a warning regarding a risk that, according to
experts, would only affect one in every one million patients receiving
the drug.25 The court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment
for the defendant, holding that the issue of "voluntary and informed
choice" was paramount, so much so that a "purely statistical point of
view," one by which it might seem useless to warn of a one-in-a-million
risk, was inappropriate. 26 It seems highly unlikely that a consumer
warned of such a risk would forgo the benefits of a polio vaccine. But,
23 493 F.2d at 1089.
24 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 8, at 288. Henderson and Twerski note:
In informed-consent cases, where the function of a particular warning
would have been to empower the plaintiff by allowing him to decide
whether he wished to expose himself to the risk at all, second-guessing the
decision the plaintiff would have made had he received the warning defeats
the objective sought to be achieved: to transfer the decision from the defen-
dant to the plaintiff. In these cases, therefore, the presumption for the
plaintiff is justified. By contrast, when the role of the warning is the more
traditional one of risk reduction, the plaintiffs burden arguably should be
higher.
Id. (citation omitted).
25 399 F.2d at 124, 127.
26 Id. at 129.
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given the court's concern for the dignity of potential users, whether
the plaintiff would have heeded such a warning is secondary to ensur-
ing that the plaintiff had a true choice.
3. The Open and Obvious Danger Rule
In addition to working through the semantics of "strict liability"
and distinguishing the different purposes that failure-to-warn liability
might serve, courts have recognized at least one clear limitation on
the duty to provide product users and consumers with information.
Courts and commentators overwhelmingly agree that there is no
duty to instruct or warn consumers about obvious 27 or generally-
27 See, e.g., Plante v. Hobart Corp., 771 F.2d 617, 620-21 (1st Cir. 1985) (applying
Maine law and holding that the danger of placing one's hands into the blades of a potato
chopper is obvious as a matter of law); Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23, 28
(D.C. Cir. 1957) ("[T]he only danger being not latent but obvious to any possible user, if
the article does not break or go awry, but injury occurs through a mishap in normal use,
the article reacting in its normal and foreseeable manner, the manufacturer is not liable
for negligence."); Davis v. Komatsu Am. Indus., 46 F. Supp. 2d 745, 753-54 (W.D. Tenn.
1999) ("[A] product 'is not unreasonably dangerous because of [a] failure to warn of a
danger that is apparent to the ordinary user."'), rev'd in part by, 2001 \WL 1042229 (6th Cir.
Aug. 29, 2001) (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-105(d) (2000)); Glittenberg v. Doughboy
Recreational Indus., 491 N.W.2d 208, 213, 214 n.15 (Mich. 1992) (holding that "[a] manu-
facturer has no duty to warn if it reasonably perceives that the potentially dangerous condi-
tion of the product is readily apparent or may be disclosed by a mere casual inspection,"
and citing nineteen American jurisdictions that observe the open and obvious danger
rule); Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 700 N.E.2d 303, 308 (N.Y. 1998) [hereinafter Liriano I1]
("[A] limited class of hazards need not be warned of as a matter of law because they are
patently dangerous or pose open and obvious risks."); McMurry v. Inmont Corp., 694
N.Y.S.2d 157, 158-59 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (holding as obvious the danger of placing
one's hand into contact with the rollers of an industrial fabric machine); Barnes v. Pine
Tree Mach., 691 N.Y.S.2d 398, 399 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (stating that the danger of operat-
ing a wire-stripping machine with the safety guards removed was obvious); RESTATEMENT,
supra note 9, § 2 cmt. j ("In general, a product seller is not subject to liability for failing to
warn or instruct regarding risks and risk-avoidance measures that should be obvious to, or
generally known by, foreseeable product users."); MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT,
44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,725 (1979) ("[A] manufacturer should be able to assume that the
product user is familiar with obvious hazards .... ); Hildy Bowbeer et al., Warning! Failure
to Read This Article May Be Hazardous to Your Failure to Warn Defense, 27 Wm. MITCHELL L.
REv. 439, 447-49 (2000); Bowbeer & Killoran, supra note 4, at 726-27 nn.53-54, 726-30
(surveying jurisdictions and discussing the rule); Henderson & Twerski, supra note 8, at
280 ("The general rule in American products law is that defendants owe no duty to warn of
risks that are obvious to normal, reasonable users and consumers."); Kevin Reynolds &
Richard J. Kirschman, The Ten Myths of Product Liability, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 551, 575
(2000) (" [T] here is no legal duty to remind a plaintiff of that which is already known or of
dangers that are open and obvious."); James B. Sales, The Duty to Warn and Instruct for Safe
Use in Strict Tort Liability, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 521, 547 (1982) (" [W]here the risk of harm or
danger posed by a product is neither hidden or latent, the absence of a warning will not
render the product defective."). See generally AMERICAN LAw OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 32:63
(3d ed. 1993) (citing 37 American jurisdictions that follow the rule); Allan E. Korpella,
Annotation, Failure to Warn as Basis of Liability Under Doctrine of Strict Liability in Tort, 53
A.L.R.3d 239, 257 §7 (1973) (outlining the strong weight of authority in support of the
rule).
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known 28 dangers. Although manufacturers may owe duties to design
against obvious risks, 29 they owe no duty to warn against such risks.
The obviousness of a danger is itself an adequate warning.
Courts determine whether a given danger is obvious on objective
grounds; an obvious danger is one that a reasonable person would
recognize as such, 3 0 although the expertise of the user or consumer
can affect a court's decision whether to impose liability for failing to
warn.3 1 Of course, "[w]hen reasonable persons can differ as to the
obviousness of the danger," the question is for the jury.32 The obvious
corollary to this last point is that reasonable persons cannot differ as to
the obviousness of some dangers. It is these dangers that a court may
hold obvious as a matter of law, thus extinguishing a plaintiffs claim
that a defendant owed her a duty to warn.
33
The scope and rationale of the open and obvious danger rule are
fairly straightforward. The rule applies to every failure-to-warn claim,
whether brought in the name of risk reduction or informed choice.
34
Risk-reduction would not be served by requiring manufacturers to
28 See, e.g., Rosebrock v. Gen. Elec. Co., 140 N.E. 571, 574 (N.Y. 1923) (holding, per
Judge Crane, that "I take it that an instrument which may be dangerous and is generally
known [to members of the plaintiffs profession] as a danger need not be warned against
by a seller."); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. McGuire, 814 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tex. 1991)
("[T]he danger of developing the disease of alcoholism from prolonged and excessive
consumption of alcoholic beverages is... within the ordinary knowledge common to the
community."); Bowbeer et al., supra note 27, at 445 ("[M]anufacturers and sellers need not
provide a warning when the danger or potentiality of danger is generally known and recog-
nized."); Sales, supra note 27, at 577-79.
29 Thus, that a danger is obvious may relieve a manufacturer of a duty to warn, but it
will not bar a claim that the product is defective in design. See, e.g., Micallef v. Miehle Co.,
348 N.E.2d 571, 577 (N.Y. 1976), overruling Campo v. Scofield, 95 N.E.2d 802, 806 (N.Y.
1950) (applying the patent-danger rule to bar a defective-design claim).
30 See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILrrY §32:66 (3d ed. 1993).
31 See Sales, supra note 27, at 579-82. Of course, a clear-thinking court will realize that
an expertise-based limitation on liability is one grounded in causation analysis. The open
and obvious danger rule is a no duty rule. Although manufacturers have no duty to warn
any class of users about open and obvious dangers, they do have a duty to warn every class
of users about nonobvious dangers. That a particular class of users has the expertise to
know of such a nonobvious danger will not relieve the manufacturer of its duty, but it may
prevent a breach of that duty from being a legal cause of injury.
32 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 2 cmt.j; HENDERSON & TWERSKi, supra note 21, at
344.
33 See, e.g., Chaney v. Hobart Int'l, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 2d 677, 681 (E.D. La. 1999) (citing
LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.57(B) (West 1997)) (holding the danger posed by an unguarded
commercial meat grinder obvious as a matter of law). That obviousness can abrogate duty
raises an important procedural point. Commentators occasionally confuse the role of obvi-
ousness, seeing it not as part of a plaintiff's prima facie case (to show non-obviousness), but
rather as an affirmative defense. See, e.g., Douglas R. Richmond, Expanding Products Liabil-
ity: Manufacturers' Post-Sale Duties to Warn, Retrofit and Recall, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 7, 18 n.73
(1999) ("Manufacturers and distributors have a number of affirmative defenses at their
disposal. For example, in many jurisdictions they need not warn of open or obvious dan-
gers, or dangers that are commonly known.").
34 In explaining informed-choice, the Restatement notes the following:
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warn of open and obvious risks. Attaching a warning about a patent
risk would be useless.3 5 As the New York Court of Appeals explained,
"when a warning would have added nothing to the user's appreciation
of the danger, no duty to warn exists as no benefit would be gained by
requiring a warning."3 6 Indeed, if a product user already has available
sufficient indicia of the danger, then a warning of that danger is sim-
ply redundant.
Similarly, in informed-choice cases, the goal of facilitating "true
choice" would not be served by requiring manufacturers to warn of
open and obvious risks. The obviousness of a risk, even a
nonreducible risk, ought to present the user or consumer with suffi-
cient information to make a fully informed choice whether to use or
consume a product. Courts agree. For example, in a leading in-
formed-choice decision, a court affirmed ajury verdict for the plaintiff
against an asbestos manufacturer, noting that "we cannot say that, as a
matter of law, the danger was sufficiently obvious to asbestos insula-
tion workers to relieve the defendants of the duty to warn. ' 37 Thus,
when a danger is sufficiently obvious, failure-to-warn liability remains
sensibly limited. Still, courts occasionally test the limits of common
sense.
B. Liriano Facts and Holdings
In September 1993, seventeen-year-old Luis Liriano lost his right
hand and lower forearm while operating a commercial meat grinder
at work.3 Liriano had some experience operating a commercial meat
grinder, 39 and Super Associated grocery store ("Super") had em-
In addition to alerting users and consumers to the existence and nature of
product risks so that they can, by appropriate conduct during use or con-
sumption, reduce the risk of harm, warnings also may be needed to inform
users and consumers of nonobvious and not generally known risks that unavoid-
ably inhere in using or consuming the product. Such warnings allow the
user or consumer to avoid the risk warned against by making an informed
decision not to purchase or use the product at all and hence not to encoun-
ter the risk. In this context, warnings must be provided for inherent risks
that reasonably foreseeable product users and consumers would reasonably
deem material or significant in deciding whether to use or consume the
product.
RESTATEMENT § 2 cmt. i (emphasis added).
35 See AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 32:63 (3d ed. 1993) (noting that an
obvious danger carries its own warning); Henderson & Twerski, supra note 8, at 282
("[N]othing is to be gained by adding a warning of the danger already telegraphed by the
product itself.").
36 Liriano II, 700 N.E.2d 303, 308 (N.Y. 1998); see also Sales, supra note 27, at 575-77
(discussing the open and obvious danger rule and arguing that "[i]t would be redundant
to warn an ultimate user of a hazard that is clearly obvious and known").
•47 Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1093 (5th Cir. 1973).
48 Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 132 F.3d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Liriano 1].
319 See Bowbeer & Killoran, supra note 4, at 719 (citing Brief for Appellee at 10, Liriano
Ii, 170 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1999) (Nos. 96-9641(L), 97-7449)).
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ployed him to operate one in its meat department.40 Hobart Corpora-
tion ("Hobart") manufactured and sold the grinder in 1961, and had
equipped it with a safety guard to prevent operators' hands from con-
tacting the grinding "worm. '' 41 Hobart affixed the guard in such a way
that it could be removed only by "forcibly destroying the rivets" that
held it in place. 42 Hobart had also affixed a warning to keep one's
fingers clear of the mouth of the grinder and to use a "stomper" to
push meat into the machine. 43 However, neither the guard 44 nor the
warning 45 was on the grinder at the time of Liriano's accident. In fact,
the guard had been removed just weeks before the accident,46 while it
was in Super's possession. 47 While Liriano was feeding meat into the
grinder with his hands, his right hand got caught in the grinding
worm.
4 8
Liriano brought suit in New York state court against Hobart,
claiming, among other things, defective design and failure to warn.49
Hobart removed the case to federal court and impleaded Super as a
third-party defendant.50 At trial, the court dismissed Liriano's design
claim, but allowed his failure-to-warn claim to reach the jury.51 Ini-
tially, the jury returned a verdict for Liriano, apportioning five per-
cent of liability to Hobart and ninety-five percent to Super, but on
partial retrial, assigned one-third liability to plaintiff Liriano.52 Both
Hobart and Super appealed, arguing that the trial court should have
40 Liriano 1, 132 F.3d at 125.
41 Id.
42 Bowbeer & Killoran, supra note 4, at 719 n.13 (citing Brief for Defendant Hobart
Corp. at 4, Liriano II, 700 N.E.2d 303 (N.Y. 1998)). In 1962, after learning that some users
were removing the safety guards, Hobart began placing warnings regarding the dangers of
removing the guard on grinders that it subsequently manufactured and sold. Liriano I, 132
F.3d at 125.
43 Bowbeer & Killoran, supra note 4, at 718 n.9 (citing Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at
12, Liriano I1).
44 Liriano 1, 132 F.3d at 125.
45 See Bowbeer & Killoran, supra note 4, at 718.
46 See id. at 719 n.4 (citing Brief for Defendant Hobart Corp. at 4, Liriano II).
47 Liriano I, 132 F.3d at 125.
48 Id.
49 Id. Strictly speaking, Liriano asserted a "post-sale failure to warn" claim, as he ar-
gued that Hobart should have arranged to place a warning on grinders it had already sold.
See RESTATEMENT § 10. Although the Restatement outlines elements specific to such claims,
such as the requirement that the defendant be on notice of the danger its product poses,
these elements are elaborations on the basic doctrine. See id. § 10(b)(1)-(4). Post-sale
failure-to-warn claims, like all failure-to-warn claims, are subject to the requirements that
the subject of the warning be non-obvious and the lack of a warning proximately caused
the plaintiffs harm. This Note argues that Liriano's claim is problematic in regard to
these basic requirements. Therefore, for the purposes of this Note, I will treat Liriano's
claim as a standard failure-to-warn claim.
50 Liriano 1, 132 F.3d at 125.
51 See id.
52 Id. at 125-26.
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granted summary judgment for the defendants. Specifically, Hobart
argued it had no duty to warn under the facts of the case.5-
On Hobart's appeal, the Second Circuit certified two questions to
the New York Court of Appeals. First, the court asked whether "manu-
facturer liability [can] exist under a failure to warn theory in cases in
which the substantial modification defense would preclude liability
under a design defect theory. '54 The question arose because the trial
court had predicated its dismissal of Liriano's design-defect claim on
the rule, announced in Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Division of Package Ma-
chinery Co.,55 that a manufacturer is not liable for harm caused by its
product in circumstances in which substantial modification by a third-
party is the cause of the product's dangerous condition. 56 Thus, the
Second Circuit's first question was whether failure-to-warn claims are
exempt from Robinson. The second question certified to the New York
court was whether, if Robinson does not apply to failure-to-warn cases,
"manufacturer liability [is] barred as a matter of law on the facts of
this case."57 Here, the Second Circuit was asking whether a New York
court would have held that Hobart had no duty to warn.
The New York Court of Appeals answered the first certified ques-
tion in the affirmative-failure-to-warn claims are exempt from Robin-
son, and thus a manufacturer may be liable for failing to warn even
when a third-party has substantially modified the product that caused
harm. 58 The court also noted that although it might very well be "im-
possible" for a manufacturer to take into account all potential post-
sale modifications when designing a product, "it is neither infeasible
nor onerous, in some cases, to warn of the dangers of foreseeable
modifications that pose the risk of injury. ' 59 In so ruling, the court set
a more permissive standard for warning claims than for design claims.
Thus, although a court may still decide that substantial modification
of a product obviates the manufacturer's duty to warn, the court may
rightly decide, "in some cases," that such modification does not obvi-
ate that duty. After announcing that a manufacturer may have a duty
5A See id.
54 Id. at 132.
55 403 N.E.2d 440, 444 (N.Y. 1980).
56 Robinson is, however, tempered by the rule that such manufacturers may still be
held liable if the product modifications are highly foreseeable, such as when the manufac-
turer designs a product so that it can easily be used without a given safety feature, and
harm results from such use. See Lopez v. Precision Papers, Inc., 492 N.E.2d 1214, 1215
(N.Y. 1986).
57 Liriano 1, 132 F.3d at 132.
58 Liriano 11, 700 N.E.2d 303, 306 (N.Y. 1998).
59 Id. at 307. The court relied on the notion that manufacturers' decisions regarding
warnings involve fewer "interdependent factors" than their decisions regarding design. See
id. For an interesting discussion of the (perhaps judicially intractable) interdependence of
design factors, see James A. Henderson,Jr.,Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973).
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to warn even if a third party has substantially modified the product in
question, the New York court turned to the second certified ques-
tion-and declined to answer it.60 Rather than deciding whether this
case was one of "those cases" in which the duty to warn survives a
substantial modification of the product, the court placed the decision
back in the hands of the Second Circuit.
6'
With the New York Court of Appeals having announced the possi-
bility of a substantial-modification duty to warn and then declining to
put that duty in context, the Second Circuit had the opportunity to
decide whether to apply it to Hobart. Judge Guido Calabresi, writing
for the court, held that Hobart did indeed have a duty to warn. 62 The
court affirmed Liriano's jury verdict over Hobart's arguments that the
risk involved was obvious as a matter of law and that Liriano presented
insufficient evidence that the lack of a warning proximately caused his
injuries.63 Judge Calabresi's treatment of the issue of obviousness,
and the resultant imposition of a duty to warn-on the manufacturer
of a commercial meat grinder-merits close scrutiny.
C. Assessments of the Second Circuit's Application of the Duty
to Warn
Despite the rule that manufacturers have no duty to warn of obvi-
ous dangers, 64 the court in Liriano III affirmed the plaintiffs jury ver-
dict without determining whether the danger in the case was obvious.
After taking the opportunity to suggest rhetorically that the twentieth
century saw both the contraction of judicial power to impose (or with-
hold) liability as a matter of law and the complementary expansion of
deference to juries, Judge Calabresi addressed the case at hand.65 He
first asserted that whether New York courts would hold the danger of
meat grinders obvious as a matter of law "is anything but obvious,"
66
and ultimately concluded, over the defendant's objection that it had
no duty to warn of the obvious danger posed by meat grinders, that
"the duty to warn is not necessarily obviated merely because a danger
is clear."'67 To justify this apparent abrogation of the open and obvi-
ous danger rule, Judge Calabresi explained that the "functions of
warnings" are more complex than one might have thought.
68
60 Lifiano 11, 700 N.E.2d at 304.
61 See id.
62 See Liriano 11, 170 F.3d 264, 271 (2d Cir. 1999).
63 See id. at 271-72.
64 See sources cited supra note 27.
65 See Liriano 111, 170 F.3d at 267-68.
66 Id. at 269.




1. Did Judge Calabresi Correctly Identify a Split in New York
Authority over the Obviousness of the Danger?
Given that Judge Calabresi ultimately concluded that whether a
risk is obvious is not determinative of a manufacturer's duty to warn,
his discussion of whether New York courts would find the danger of
commercial meat grinders obvious is merely dicta. However, the dis-
cussion is worth pausing over, as it illustrates the intellectual strategy
of the decision as a whole. Judge Calabresi relegates the entire argu-
ment to a footnote, in which he offers evidence of a split in New York
authority regarding the danger of meat grinders.69 To show that "no
clear doctrine emerges" from the New York cases dealing with the
dangerousness of meat grinders, Calabresi juxtaposes two cases.70 In
one case, the Second Department of the New York Appellate Division
asserted that "'[t]he hazards of inserting one's hand into an open
meat grinder while the machine is operating are patent.', 71 After not-
ing that this assertion is "suggestive," but not dispositive, Calabresi out-
lines a case that he claims "cuts the opposite way."'72
Calabresi argues that Garcia v. Biro Manufacturing Co. 75 "can be
read to imply that the danger of operating meat grinders without
safety guards is not obvious as a matter of law." 74 In Garcia, the Court
of Appeals denied the defendant-manufacturer's motion for summary
judgment, and allowed the plaintiff's claim for defective design to
reach the jury.75 According to Calabresi,
[i]t follows, one might argue, that under New York law a manufac-
turer could be held stricdy liable for injuries caused by guardless
meat grinders and hence that the lack of a safety guard is a design
defect under New York law. Under the consumer expectation test,
an obvious danger does not make a product defective, because no
implied warranty is breached. One could therefore conclude that
the danger posed by meat grinders lacking safety guards is not
deemed obvious as a matter of law in New York.
76
If the reasoning entailed by the above passage seems unclear, that
is because it is unclear. To better understand what Calabresi is sug-
gesting, one needs to reconstruct the argument, including the missing
premises. What Calabresi seems to be suggesting is an argument
along the following lines:
69 See id. at 269-70 n.4.
70 See id.
71 See id. (quoting Hernandez v. Biro Mfg. Co., 674 N.Y.S.2d 72, 74 (N.Y. App. Div.
1998) (dicta)).
72 Liriano Il, 170 F.3d at 269 n.4.
7- 469 N.E.2d 834 (N.Y. 1984).
74 Liriano Il, 170 F.3d at 269 n.4.
75 See id.
76 Id. (citations omitted).
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1) The consumer-expectations test is the standard for design de-
fect in New York; assuming a product has caused harm, its design is
defective in New York if and only if an average consumer would not
expect to be harmed by the product as designed.
2) It follows from (1) that if an average consumer would expect to
be harmed by a product, then New York courts would not deem that
product defectively designed.
3) Average consumers would expect to be harmed by a product
that poses open and obvious dangers.
4) Thus, by (2) and (3), if a product poses an open and obvious
danger, then New York courts would not deem that product defec-
tively designed.
5) It follows from (4) that if New York courts would deem a prod-
uct defectively designed, then that product does not pose an open
and obvious danger.
6) In Garcia, the New York court, in denying the defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment, announced that it might deem guar-
dless meat grinders defectively designed.
7) Thus, by (5) and (6), because the New York court would (possi-
bly) deem guardless meat grinders defectively designed, guardless
meat grinders do not pose an open and obvious danger.
Despite Judge Newman's reminder that "the life of the law is not logic
but experience," 77 the logic of an argument is like the grammar of a
sentence; when one is imprecise with it, meaning is at best unfortu-
nately unclear-and at worst intentionally obscured.
Calabresi's argument is valid, 78 but not sound.7 9 There are at
least two substantive problems with it. First, the consumer expecta-
tions test is arguably not the standard for defective design in New
Yoi-k. New York courts apply a risk-utility balancing test for design-
defect cases.8 1 Therefore, neither premise (1) nor its implication,
premise (2), is true. Consequently, subconclusion (4) does not fol-
low. The second substantive problem with the argument is that not
only does (4) not follow from its premises, but it is also false. One can
plainly see the problem with (4) by noticing that it is a bald statement
77 Id. at 275 (Newman,J. concurring) (citing OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,JR., THE COM-
MON LAw 1 (1891)).
78 By standard philosophical formulation, "[a]n argument is deductively valid if and
only if it is not possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false." MERRIE
BERGMANN ET AL., THE LOGIc BOOK 11 (3d ed. 1998). In other words, in a valid argument,
if the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true; validity is a formal test of
whether an argument is properly structured.
79 "An argument is deductively sound if and only if it is deductively valid and all its
premises are true." Id. at 12. A sound argument, then, necessarily produces a true conclu-
sion; soundness is a substantive test.
80 See, e.g., Scarangella v. Thomas Built Buses, Inc., 717 N.E.2d 679, 681-82 (N.Y.
1999) (applying "factors to be considered in balancing the risks created by the product's




of the now defunct patent-danger rule in design-defect cases.8 1 If (4)
is false, its contrapositive, premise (5), is also false. If (5) is false, then
conclusion (7) does not follow.
Of course, that (7) does not logically follow from this argument
does not mean that (7) is false. There might be an argument from
which one can properly derive (7). But, when an intellectually sophis-
ticated judge, sitting on a prestigious court, summons a patently un-
sound argument in support of a claim, and buries that argument in a
footnote, one begins to wonder whether the claim is true, and
whether the judge harbors some reservations about its soundness.
Would a New York court have deemed the danger of operating a guar-
dless meat grinder obvious as a matter of law? Unfortunately, the
Court of Appeals declined to answer that question, and the Second
Circuit avoided it, preferring to wave its hands at the most salient issue
in the case.
2. Have the Critics Correctly Concluded that the Second Circuit Both
Abrogated the Open and Obvious Danger Rule and
Misapplied Informed Choice?
After arguing that it is unclear whether New York courts would
hold the danger of operating a guardless meat grinder obvious as a
matter of law, the Second Circuit entertained a counterfactual, hold-
ing that "even if the danger of using a grinder were itself deemed
obvious," Hobart still may have a duty to warn.8 2 Hildy Bowbeer and
David Killoran argue that in doing so, the court abrogated the open
and obvious danger rule. They note that in "[s]tepping around the
issue of whether the dangers associated with meat grinders are obvi-
ous as a matter of law in New York, the court held that a jury could
impose on product manufacturers a duty to warn of obvious risks."8 3
Bowbeer and Killoran's argument is persuasive. The open and obvi-
ous danger rule states that product manufacturers have no duty to
warn of risks that would be obvious to a reasonable person. 4 In other
words, the duty to warn is obviated if a danger is clear. The Second
Circuit, however, baldly asserted that "the duty to warn is not necessa-
rily obviated merely because a danger is clear. '8 5 The conclusion that
the court abrogated the rule is thus difficult to avoid. Part II of this
Note focuses on whether that conclusion is warranted.
In another seemingly problematic turn, in holding that Hobart
had a duty to warn of the dangers of operating a guardless meat
81 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
82 See Liriano IIl, 170 F.3d at 271.
83 Bowbeer & Killoran, supra note 4, at 722.
84 See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
85 Liriano III, 170 F.3d at 270.
[Vol. 88:814
AN INFORMED-CHOICE DUTY TO INSTRUCT?
grinder, the Second Circuit relied on the theory of "informed choice."
The court argued that "a warning can do more than exhort its audi-
ence to be careful. It can also affect what activities the people warned
choose to engage in."'8 6 Bowbeer and Killoran argue that the court
got it wrong again; the authors explain that "the scenario in the Liri-
ano case has none of the characteristics of the settings in which courts
have found 'informed choice' warnings appropriate. The case in-
volves methods of keeping employees' hands out of operating meat
grinders. The risk was neither latent nor unavoidable. '8 7 Again,
Bowbeer and Killoran are persuasive. Regardless of which function a
warning might serve, that warning is not legally required if it conveys
otherwise obvious information. If the court is attempting to suggest
that characterizing the function of a warning differently can somehow
allow one to ignore the fact that the subject matter of the warning is
obvious, then the court has simply misunderstood the functions of
warnings, as well as their relationship to the open and obvious danger
rule.
II
LiRIrANo REVISITED: THE DUTY TO WARN THROUGH THE
LENS OF BURKE v. SPARTANICS LTD.
The Second Circuit revisited the duty-to-warn doctrine in Burke v.
Spartanics Ltd.,88 the facts of which are quite similar to Liriano II. In
fact, the plaintiff in Burke explicitly relied on Liriano III in making his
arguments; thus, the court had the opportunity to address directly
that decision's troublesome implications.8 9 Did the Liriano III court
actually abrogate a central, uncontroversial element of the duty to
warn, and then mistakenly apply a novel theory of purpose to a con-
jured duty? The claim that Liriano III expanded the duty to warn to
include a duty to warn even of patent dangers is striking. But Judge
Calabresi, writing for the court in Burke, argues that this claim is false.
According to Burke, the Liriano III holding is consistent with the rule
that a manufacturer has no duty to warn of an open and obvious dan-
ger. Calabresi is correct. Liriano III did not formally expand failure to
warn to include a duty to warn of obvious dangers. With the help of a
closer look at failure to warn, Liriano III emerges as a coherent exer-
cise in theoretical subtlety.
86 Id. (citing Henderson & Twerski, supra note 8, at 285).
87 Bowbeer & Killoran, supra note 4, at 749.
88 252 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2001).
89 See id. at 137-41.
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A. A Closer Look at Failure to Warn
When Liriano III is compared with the standard for failure to
warn, 90 the decision does seem to have straightforwardly violated at
least two of the elements of that doctrine. Liriano III seems to have
both expanded the duty to warn by abrogating the open and obvious
danger rule and misconstrued the purpose of failure to warn by incor-
rectly applying an informed-choice rationale to that expanded duty.91
However, properly evaluating the truth of these claims requires a
closer inspection of the duty involved. Upon that inspection, a more
complex failure-to-warn theory emerges; failure to warn entails two
different but related duties, each of which might serve one of the two
possible purposes of providing information to product users and con-
sumers. As such, four logical combinations of duty and purpose
might exist in any given case.
1. Two Duties Entailed by the Doctrine
The notion that there is a single, unified duty to warn, or that
"failure to warn" is a univocal legal doctrine, is an oversimplification.
In fact, failure to warn involves two different but related duties-the
duty to warn and the duty to instruct.92 Professors Henderson and
Twerski offer the following explanation and example of the two
duties:
90 See supra Part I.A.
91 See supra Part I.C.2.
92 See White v. ABCO Eng'g Corp., 221 F.3d 293, 306 (2d Cir. 2000) (applying New
Jersey law for the proposition that
[I]n any product liability action the manufacturer or seller shall not be lia-
ble for harm caused by a failure to warn if the product contains an ade-
quate warning or instruction . . . . An adequate product warning or
instruction is one that a reasonably prudent person in the same or similar
circumstances would have provided with respect to the danger and that
communicates adequate information on the dangers and safe use of the
product ....
(quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4 (West 2000)) (emphasis added); Wagner v. Clark
Equip. Co., 788 A.2d 83, 87 n.6 (Conn. 2002) ("'Product liability claim' shall include, but
is not limited to, all actions based on the following theories: .. .breach of or failure to
discharge a duty to warn or instruct ...." (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572m (1991))
(emphasis added)); RESTArEMENT, supra note 9, § 2 cmt. i ("Instructions inform persons
how to use and consume products safely. Warnings alert users and consumers to the exis-
tence and nature of product risks so that they can prevent harm either by appropriate
conduct during use or consumption or by choosing not to use or consume."); AMERICAN
LAw OF PROOucTs LIABILIr §32:20 (3d ed. 1993) ("[T]he duty to warn actually consists of
two duties: (1) to provide adequate instructions for safe use, and (2) to provide a warning
as to dangers inherent in improper use."); Bowbeer et al., supra note 27, at 445 ("There are
two elements to the duty: the duty to warn of foreseeable dangers inherent in the use of
the product, and the duty to provide adequate instructions for safe use."); cf Antcliff v.
State Employees Credit Union, 327 N.W.2d 814, 816-17 (Mich. 1982) (noting a subtle
difference between instructions and warnings).
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Warnings describe risks that would not otherwise be obvious to per-
sons of average intelligence and experience. "Caution! The top of
this product becomes very hot!" Instructions tell product users what
they should do to reduce the risks of injury. "Wear insulated gloves
to protect your hands." More often than not, product suppliers will
be required to supply both sorts of information. Sometimes only
the warning is necessary, as when "what to do about it" is obvious.
Less frequently, only instructions are required, as when the risk is
obvious but an effective risk-avoidance technique is not.
93
Thus, most often, when courts speak of imposing a duty to warn, they
might mean just that; manufacturers and distributors may have a duty
to warn users and consumers about certain risks inherent in the use or
consumption of products. 9 4 That the top of a product gets very hot is
a danger of which the product manufacturer should apprise the user.
Typically, this is the duty that first comes to mind when considering
failure to warn as a basis of liability.
The second duty that courts impose on product manufacturers is
not a duty to warn of risks, but rather a duty to instruct on risk-avoid-
ance measures. That is, in addition to or instead of a duty to warn,
manufacturers and distributors may have a duty to "provide appropri-
ate and adequate instructions and directions for the safe use of a
product. '9 5 Thus, a manufacturer might have a duty not only to ex-
plain to a user or consumer that using a product in a particular way is
dangerous, but also that there is a safer way to use the product. Cases
in which plaintiffs argue only that the defendants breached a duty to
instruct are less common than those in which plaintiffs argue that de-
fendants breached a duty to warn, but, on the right facts, the claim is
sensible.
In Oglesby v. Delaware & Hudson Railway Co.,96 for example, the
plaintiff, an employee of the defendant railway, hurt his back while
attempting to adjust the position of his "engineer's seat" on a locomo-
93 HENDERSON & TWERSKI, supra note 21, at 337.
94 See, e.g., Broussard v. Cont'l Oil Co., 433 So. 2d 354, 358 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (hold-
ing that an electric drill manufacturer adequately warned of the risk that sparks from the
drill could ignite gaseous fumes).
95 Sales, supra note 27, at 524; see also Tesmer v. Rich Ladder Co., 380 N.W.2d 203, 207
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (affirming plaintiff's jury verdict predicated on claim that ladder
manufacturer provided insufficient instructions on how to use its product safely); Mlott v.
Whirlpool Corp., 676 N.Y.S.2d 383 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (holding that the manufacturer
of a kit for converting a clothes dryer from natural gas to propane power had no duty to
instruct the installing technician of the proper torque with which to tighten the shutoff
valve nut because the technician in question was experienced and testified that he would
have ignored such an instruction). See generally AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUcrS LIABiLITy
§ 32:21 (3d ed. 1993) (describing the need for manufacturers to provide instructions when
certain procedures are essential to the safe use of a product).
96 180 F.3d 458 (2d Cir. 1999).
2003]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
tive.9 7 The seat was designed for easy adjustment by removing it from
its mount, but the plaintiff tried to adjust it without first removing it.98
He sued the manufacturer, General Motors, arguing "that GM should
have placed a warning or instructional label on the seat informing
employees of the easier adjustment procedure."99 Indeed, what the
plaintiff sought is more accurately described as an instruction than a
warning. Although the court held that Oglesby's claim was pre-
empted by the Locomotive Boiler and Inspection Act, 100 the facts are
a clear example of the sort of liability a manufacturer might incur not,
strictly speaking, for failing to warn of a risk, but rather for failing to
instruct on a risk-avoidance measure.
In Urena v. Biro Manufacturing Co., the plaintiff was employed as
the operator of a band saw used for cutting meat.10 The manufac-
turer of the saw had sold it with an adjustable guard that covered the
portion of the blade not being used for a given cut. 10 2 The manufac-
turer also provided a safety plate for use in pushing pieces of meat
across the cutting surface.'0 3 However, neither the safety plate nor
the guard was on the machine when the plaintiff was using the saw. '
0 4
While he was cutting pigs' feet, the plaintiff's hand came into contact
with the blade, injuring two of his fingers. 10 5 The plaintiff sued the
manufacturer, arguing that "Biro's failure to include adequate warn-
ings and instructions with [the saw] subjects Biro to strict liability."'' 0 6
The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant. 1 7 On
appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, holding that "Urena has made a
sufficient showing that Biro failed to provide adequate instructions
and warnings concerning the need to use the safety plate to cut small
pieces of meat and bone."' 08 In so holding, the court did not discuss
the obviousness of the danger, but merely asserted, without explana-
tion, that "Biro failed to establish that it had no duty to warn or that
the duty was discharged as a matter of law." 10 9 If we can reasonably
assume that the danger posed by the saw was obvious, then the manu-
facturer in this case was not held to a duty to warn of that danger;
97 Id. at 460.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 See id. at 460, 462 (citing 49 U.S.C. §§ 20701-20903 (1994)).
101 114 F.3d 359, 361 (2d Cir. 1997) (applying New York law).
102 Id.
103 Id. at 361-62.
104 See id.
105 Id. at 362.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 365.
109 Id. at 366.
[Vol. 88:814
AN INFORMED-CHOICE DUTYTO INSTRUCT?
rather, the manufacturer was held to a duty to instruct on the perhaps
nonobvious risk-avoidance technique of using a safety plate.
Of course, both the duty to warn and the duty to instruct are
subject to the open and obvious danger rule; manufacturers and dis-
tributors have neither a duty to warn of obvious risks nor a duty to
instruct on obvious risk-avoidance measures. 10 It is not too difficult
to envision a situation in which a product poses a risk for which the
method of avoiding it is not obvious.' A message such as "Warning!
This machine emits low-level radiation that can harm the retina!" cer-
tainly conveys a product risk, likely a nonobvious risk. However, what
to do about that risk-how to avoid it-might be just as nonobvious.
Therefore, the manufacturer of such a machine might have a duty to
provide a message such as "Notice: One should always wear safety
glasses made of X, and only X, when using this machine." In the end,
the factors that militate against imposing a duty to warn of obvious
risks apply with equal force against imposing a duty to instruct on ob-
vious risk-avoidance measures. Neither warning nor instructing about
obvious matters would serve any function beyond that served by the
obviousness itself.
2. A Logical Framework of Duty and Purpose
As outlined above, a failure-to-warn claim might invoke one of
two different duties-the duty to warn or the duty to instruct-each of
which is subject to the limitations of obviousness. And again, failure
to warn can serve one of two different purposes-risk reduction or
informed choice.' Thus, any given failure-to-warn claim might logi-
cally entail one of four possible combinations of duty and purpose:





A plaintiff could argue (1) that a defendant owed her a duty to warn
of nonobvious risks that inhere in using a product, because such a
warning would have helped her to use the product more safely; (2)
110 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 2 cmt. j ("In general, a product seller is not sub-
ject to liability for failing to warn or instruct regarding risks and risk-avoidance measures
that should be obvious to, or generally known by, foreseeable product users.") (emphasis
added).
III See supra Part I.A.2.
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that a defendant owed her a duty to instruct about nonobvious risk-
avoidance measures relevant to the use of the product, because such
instruction would have helped her to use the product more safely; (3)
that a defendant owed her a duty to warn of nonobvious risks that
inhere in using a product, because she could then have decided
whether to expose herself to those risks at all; or (4) that a defendant
owed her a duty to instruct about nonobvious risk-avoidance measures
relevant to the use of the product, because she could then have de-
cided whether to use the product at all.
Although failure to warn entails four logically possible combina-
tions of duty and purpose, plaintiffs and courts invoke the rationales
with varying frequency. Cases involving risk-reduction warnings are
generally the most common, and most intuitive, of the possibilities. 1
2
Clearly, manufacturers ought to attempt to reduce the risks associated
with the use of their products by making users aware of risks that are
not obvious. Cases involving risk-reduction instructions are less com-
mon, but no less intuitive.' ' After all, manufacturers and distributors
have a vested interest in providing users and consumers with instruc-
tions on how to use their products safely.' 14 Cases in which manufac-
turers owe a duty to provide informed-choice warnings are rare, but
are not entirely unintuitive. 1 5 These cases are "generally limited to
prescription drugs and cosmetics, although occasionally other prod-
ucts are implicated."' 16 The final logical possibility in failure to warn,
wherein a manufacturer has a duty to provide an informed-choice in-
struction, appears to be as rare as it is unintuitive.





Although the duty to instruct is intuitively plausible, and providing
product users and consumers with information with which they can
112 See, e.g., Broussard v. Cont'l Oil Co., 433 So. 2d 354, 358 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
113 See, e.g., Oglesby v. Del. & Hudson Ry. Co., 180 F.3d 458, 460 (2d Cir. 1999).
114 Of course, product manufacturers have a pecuniary, and perhaps moral, interest in
providing warnings to users and consumers. However, the interest in providing instruc-
tions seems distinguishable, as users and consumers cannot even begin to use or consume
(at least some) products without some sort of instruction.
1 15 See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088-89 (5th Cir.
1973); Twerski et al., supra note 19, at 517-21.
116 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 8, at 286.
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make informed choices is understandable in some circumstances,
whether the two are practically compatible remains an open question.
B. Burke Facts and Holding
Alphonso Burke lost the fingers of his right hand while operating
a metal shearing machine at work.' 17 Burke had approximately seven
months' experience using the shearing machine. 118 Spartanics Ltd.
("Spartanics") manufactured the machine with a conveyor belt ramp
at its end that carried metal scraps away from the cutting surface. 119
However, Burke's employer, Metal Etching Co. ("Metal Etching"),
had installed another ramp above the conveyor belt ramp to catch
metal scraps as they left the cutting surface. 120 Once metal scraps ac-
cumulated on this new ramp, removing them required the operator to
place one hand on the cutting surface, for leverage. 121 While clearing
metal scraps from the employer-installed ramp, Burke had his right
hand on the cutting surface.' 22 His supervisor, who had been in-
structing him on how to perform ajob, began shearing metal with the
machine and inadvertently severed Burke's fingers. 123
Burke brought defective-design and failure-to-warn claims against
Spartanics in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New
York. 124 Spartanics, in turn, impleaded Metal Etching as a third-party
defendant. 25 At trial, the jury found against Burke on all counts. 126
Relying on Liriano III, Burke appealed, arguing that the trial judge's
jury instructions misstated the manufacturer's duty to warn. 127 Specif-
ically, Burke objected to the following jury instruction, which he ar-
gued misstated Spartanics's duty to warn: "[ifl the dangers associated
with the machine were obvious, and generally known and recognized,
you will find that the defendant Spartanics had no duty to warn Mr.
Burke of the dangers associated with the metal shearing machine."'12
Burke's argument on appeal was that "the court below erred in in-
structing the jury that Spartanics had no duty to warn of risks that
were 'obvious."' 129 Indeed, if Liriano III really did expand the duty of
117 Burke v. Spartanics Ltd., 252 F.3d 131, 133 (2d Cir. 2001).






124 Id. at 133-34.
125 Id. at 134.
126 Id.
127 See id. at 137.
128 Id.
129 Id. Burke also argued that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that if
Burke actually knew of the danger involved in operating the machine, then Spartanics had
2003]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
manufacturers such that a danger's obviousness will not necessarily
obviate the duty to warn, 130 then Burke's argument seems sound.
However, Judge Calabresi, writing for the court, denied that Liriano III
stood for such an expansion of the duty to warn.
Affirming the jury verdict for the defendant, the court stated that
Burke's contention was "plainly wrong [in light of the] well-estab-
lished principle of New York law that 'a limited class of hazards need
not be warned of as a matter of law because they are patently danger-
ous or pose open and obvious risks."' 131 Further, the court asserted
that "nothing in our opinion in Liriano III suggests the contrary."
132
Given the language the court used in Liriano Il, this latter assertion
surely came as a surprise to Burke.
C. A Coherent Explanation of Liriano III
It appears that Alphonso Burke interpreted Liriano III in much
the same way that Bowbeer and Killoran have133-Burke surmised
that Liriano III expanded failure to warn to include a duty to warn of
open and obvious dangers. However, in Burke, Judge Calabresi ex-
plained that this interpretation is mistaken. While Calabresi's expla-
nation is somewhat unclear, the analytic structure assembled above
13 4
helps to show how Liriano III emerges as a theoretically legitimate ex-
ample of a court imposing an informed-choice duty to instruct on
nonobvious risk-avoidance measures, and how Liriano III is therefore
consistent with the seemingly contradictory Burke.
1. A Duty to Instruct About Nonobvious Risk-Avoidance Measures
Liriano III did not formally violate the open and obvious danger
rule because the court did not actually hold that a manufacturer had a
duty to warn of obvious risks. Instead, the court held that a manufac-
turer had a duty to instruct on nonobvious methods of avoiding risks.
The duty in Liriano III, then, was not to warn of the risks of unguarded
meat grinders; rather, it was a duty to instruct that meat grinders
should not be used without guards. In response to the plaintiffs
claim that the Second Circuit had abrogated the open and obvious
danger rule in Liriano III, the Burke court explained:
The question in Liriano IIIwas simply "obviousness of what?" ... In
Liriano III we upheld the verdict for the plaintiff because the jury
no duty to warn. The Second Circuit agreed with Burke on this point, noting that the trial
court had confused a limitation on duty with a limitation on causation, but nevertheless
held the error harmless. See id. at 138-41.
13o See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
131 Burke, 252 F.3d at 137 (quoting Liriano 11, 700 N.E.2d 303, 308 (N.Y. 1998)).
132 Id. (emphasis added).
133 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
134 See supra Part II.A.2.
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could have found that, absent an appropriate warning, it was not
obvious "(a) that it is feasible to reduce the risk with safety guards,
(b) that such guards are made available with the grinders, and (c)
that the grinders should be used only with the guards."1 3 5
According to Judge Calabresi, the court in Liriano IIIdid not impose a
duty to warn of obvious risks. 136 However, the Burke court's character-
ization of propositions (a), (b), and (c) as nonobvious risks, requiring
an "appropriate warning," is somewhat unclear. Those elements that
Calabresi characterized as nonobvious in Liriano III are more accu-
rately characterized as risk-avoidance measures, not risks. The duty
was, therefore, not a "duty to warn," but rather a duty to instruct.
Liriano III itself provides further evidence that the duty imposed
on Hobart was a duty to instruct. Always the law professor, Judge Cala-
bresi devised a careful hypothetical to which he analogized Hobart's
duty:
[A] highway sign that says "Danger-Steep Grade" says less than a
sign that says "Steep Grade Ahead-Follow Suggested Detour to
Avoid Dangerous Areas."
If the hills or mountains responsible for the 'steep grade are
plainly visible, the first sign merely states what a reasonable person
would know without having to be warned. The second sign tells
drivers what they might not have otherwise known: that there is an-
other road that is flatter and less hazardous.... [T] he duty to post a
sign of the second variety may persist even when the danger of the
road is obvious and a sign of the first type would not be warranted.
One who grinds meat, like one who drives on a steep road, can
benefit not only from being told that his activity is dangerous but
from being told of a safer way. 137
Information that a grade is steep, or that a guardless meat
grinder is dangerous, is indeed a warning. However, information that
there is a safer detour, or that meat grinders should be used with
safety guards, is an instruction. Of course, instructions often entail
(perhaps implicit) warnings of obvious risks, as do the instructions in
Calabresi's hypothetical. However, they can also entail information
about nonobvious risk-avoidance measures. The Second Circuit held
Hobart to a duty to inform Liriano of the fact that meat grinders
should be used with safety guards-a risk-avoidance measure that the
court deemed nonobvious.
Thus, when Bowbeer and Killoran, as well as Burke, interpreted
Liriano III to hold that product manufacturers have a duty "to warn of
135 Burke, 252 F.3d at 137 (citing Liriano II, 170 F.3d 264, 271 (2d Cir. 2001)).
136 Id.
137 Liriano III, 170 F.3d 264, 270 (2d Cir. 1999).
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obvious risks,"138 they were mistaken. Hildy Bowbeer does recognize
the difference between instructions and warnings, and she under-
stands that both are implicated in failure-to-warn cases. 139 Why, then,
did she not see Liriano III as a failure-to-instruct case? The answer
likely has something to do with the fact that Calabresi himself ex-
plained his holding in Liriano III in the terminology of "warnings."
140
Given this terminology, it is easy to slip into reading Liriano III as an
instance of a court imposing a duty to warn. The only danger that
Hobart might properly have warned Liriano about was the arguably
obvious danger of using an unguarded meat grinder. However, Liri-
ano III held that Hobart had a duty to instruct Liriano on a safe way to
use meat grinders. So long as the risk-avoidance measures-and not
merely dangers-were not obvious, the duty involved logically falls
into one of the four possibilities outlined above.
141
2. Informed Choice Applied to a Nonobvious Risk-Avoidance Measure
Bowbeer and Killoran criticized the Second Circuit's application
of informed choice in Liriano III on the ground that even courts that
apply informed-choice theory do so only with respect to latent dan-
gers, but Liriano III seemed to hold that Hobart had a duty to warn
Liriano of the obvious dangers of guardless meat grinders so he could
choose whether to expose himself to those risks. 142 The authors argue
that Calabresi simply misunderstood the sources that he cited for the
proposition that warnings can serve an informed-choice function:
[T] he passage from the Henderson and Twerski article quoted in
support of the newly-minted Liriano duty to warn does not, contrary
to the Liriano III court's interpretation of it, address obvious, una-
voidable risks at all. Rather, the authors observe that latent, una-
voidable risks may, in special circumstances limited primarily to
toxic agents and pharmaceuticals, trigger a duty to inform potential
users of those risks, so that the users can decide in light of the risks
and benefits... whether to use the product at all.
14 3
However, as we have seen, Judge Calabresi did not interpret informed
choice as applicable to obvious risks. Instead, he cast Liriano III as a
case in which the defendant owed a duty to inform of nonobvious risk-
avoidance measures. Again, so long as those risk-avoidance measures
were indeed nonobvious, Liriano III did not formally misconstrue or
138 Bowbeer & Killoran, supra note 4, at 722 (emphasis added).
139 See Bowbeer et al., supra note 27, at 445 ("There are two elements to the duty: the
duty to warn of foreseeable dangers inherent in the use of the product, and the duty to
provide adequate instructions for safe use.").
140 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
141 See supra Part II.A.2.
142 See Bowbeer & Killoran, supra note 4, at 730.
143 Id. (citation omitted).
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misapply the informed-choice rationale for failure to warn. Rather,
the court announced a theoretically legitimate informed-choice duty
to instruct on nonobvious risk-avoidance measures.
III
LiiuANo RECONSIDERED: THE PRACTICAL LIMITS OF
SUBTLE JURISPRUDENCE
The Second Circuit could have decided Liriano III differently. In
Chaney v. Hobart International, Inc., a case with facts nearly identical to
Liriano III, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
held that "[a] s dangerous as the meat grinder may have been without
a feed pan guard, it was clearly 'not dangerous to an extent beyond
that which would be contemplated by the ordinary user.' The possi-
bility of injury is glaring." 14 4 The Chaney court simply and decisively
found both the risks and the ways to avoid the risks of commercial
meat grinders to be plainly obvious. The contrast between the Chaney
and Liriano IIIopinions is striking. Chaney may not have delivered the
sort of theoretically subtle analysis worthy of Judge Calabresi's atten-
tion, but not every case requires such an analysis. Indeed, some cases
suffer from it. Although one can understand Liriano III as a logical
instance of existing failure-to-warn principles, Liriano HIrs formal co-
herence in no way implies practical acceptability.
Although the Liriano decisions did not technically expand the
duty to warn to include a duty to warn of obvious dangers, they did
functionally expand the duties of manufacturers and distributors in a
socially costly manner. The New York Court of Appeals perhaps sensi-
bly recognized that the duty to warn or instruct might possibly survive a
substantial-modification defense, but the court failed to "put a face"
on that duty. That is, the court failed to put its theoretical sensibilities
to practical use; it declined to provide an example of the substantive
applicability of the duty it announced. And, if the New York court is
guilty of nonfeasance, the Second Circuit surely committed misfea-
sance. In announcing an informed-choice duty to instruct, and apply-
ing it to the facts of Liriano III, the Second Circuit put a face on the
duty to warn or instruct that only a mother could love. The combined
efforts of the two courts may well have created a lawless failure-to-warn
doctrine. The New York court authorized a duty to warn even in the
face of substantial product modification. Then, by characterizing Liri-
ano III as an instruction case, the Second Circuit avoided the obvious-
danger rule. Moreover, by characterizing it as an informed-choice sit-
uation, the court avoided engaging in a causation analysis. The cumu-




lative result of the Liriano decisions is a doctrine in which every well-
pleaded failure-to-warn claim may reach the jury. It is a doctrine that
compounds the risks already inherent in overwarning of obvious
dangers.
A. What the New York Court of Appeals Did-and Did Not
Do-in Liriano II
In Liriano II, the New York Court of Appeals announced that
manufacturers might have a duty to warn of a product's dangers, even
in the face of a substantial modification to the product.' 45 Perhaps it
was sensible to hesitate to declare that such a duty could never arise.
Even if that duty does arise, though, failure to warn has built-in limita-
tions, such as the open and obvious danger rule, that should keep its
application within reasonable bounds. However, in declining to de-
cide whether Hobart actually owed a duty in Liriano II, the New York
Court of Appeals declined the opportunity to place a practical limit
on the duty it announced. In light of the Second Circuit's ultimate
application of that duty in Liriano III, perhaps the New York court's
omission was a culpable one.
1. The Court Announced a Questionable but (Perhaps) Harmless
Duty
The New York Court of Appeals faced the question of whether
the duty to warn could ever survive substantial product modification
by a third-party. Although the court has embraced a substantial-modi-
fication bar to design-defect liability,' 46 the court declined to do so for
failure-to-warn claims, suggesting that "[t] he factors militating against
imposing a duty to design against foreseeable post-sale product modi-
fications are either not present or less cogent with respect to a duty to
warn against making such modifications."'147 The court argued that
the duty to warn of dangers that might result from product modifica-
tion requires manufacturers to perform a less complicated prospective
analysis than is involved in the complex risk-utility considerations in-
herent in designing defect-free products. 4 3
Nevertheless, it is not entirely clear why having to "factor into the
design equation all foreseeable post-sale modifications" is more bur-
densome than having to do so with respect to the warning equa-
145 See Liriano II, 700 N.E.2d 303, 307-08 (N.Y. 1998).
146 See Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 403 N.E.2d 440, 444 (N.Y.
1980) ("Material alterations at the hands of a third party ... are not within the ambit of a
manufacturer's responsibility.").
147 Liriano II, 700 N.E.2d at 306.
148 See id. at 306-07.
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tion.149 The court's explanation seems to rely on the intuitively
plausible notion that warnings are relatively cheap, noting that "l[t] he
burden of placing a warning on a product is less costly than designing
a perfectly safe, tamper-resistant product."1 5 0 After all, how much
could it possibly cost to include another warning on a product?15 1 In
discussing the practical implications of Liriano III, this Note suggests
that the cost of requiring additional warnings can actually be substan-
tial, particularly when courts impose increasingly expansive duties to
warn. 15 2 However, given that the New York court merely held that the
duty to warn could survive a user's product modification, and not that
it necessarily does, the court's holding was not cause for worry. After
all, announcing a duty and applying it are two different things.
Surely, given the opportunity to apply the substantial-modification
duty to warn, the court would set reasonable bounds on that duty.
2. The Court Failed to Ensure Practical Limits on the Newly
Announced Duty
In Liriano II, the New York Court of Appeals had the chance to
place the substantial-modification duty to warn in context, expressly
delineating the sort of facts necessary to show that a manufacturer
might owe such a duty, but it declined to do so. In declining to an-
swer the Second Circuit's second certified question, the court left
open the most important practical questions. In which cases will a
duty to warn survive the substantial modification of a product? On
what facts should a court hold for a defendant as a matter of law?
Interestingly, the New York court's opinion in Liriano II has appeared
in the literature as an example of "whether and in what circumstances
a continuing warning duty might nevertheless be imposed even when
product alteration or misuse would preclude a finding of defective
design."'153 However, the New York court did not provide answers to
the questions of "whether and in what circumstances" a duty to warn
will survive a substantial modification of the product. At least, that is,
the court did not provide direct answers.
Although the court did not decide the above practical questions,
it did offer clues from which another court might surmise the answers.
The court noted that integrating safety features into products is "often
149 See id. at 307
150 Id.
151 See, e.g., Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 332 A.2d 11, 15 (Md. 1975) ("[T]he cost of giving
an adequate warning is usually so minimal, amounting only to the expense of adding some
more printing to a label, that this [risk-utility] balancing process will almost always weigh in
favor of an obligation to warn of latent dangers.
152 See infta Part III.C.
153 M. Stuart Madden, Modern Post-Sale Warnings and Related Obligations, 27 WM. MITCH-
ELL L. REV. 33, 52 (2000).
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the most effective way [for a manufacturer] to communicate that op-
eration of the product without the device is hazardous," and more
importantly, that there simply is no duty to warn of open and obvious
dangers. 54 Regarding the obviousness of a danger, the court sug-
gested that, although "bright-line pronouncements" are difficult, in
cases "[w] here only one conclusion can be drawn from the established
facts... the issue of whether the risk was open and obvious may be
decided by the court as a matter of law."'155 Thus, it seems that the
Court of Appeals, while leaving open the possibility that a manufac-
turer may have a duty to warn of the risks posed by a product substan-
tially modified by a third-party, nevertheless recognized that
manufacturers might be able to discharge that duty by providing ade-
quate safety measures, 56 or might simply have no duty if the danger is
obvious.
Perhaps, then, the failure-to-warn doctrine promulgated by the
New York court is not itself lawless. After all, even if a manufacturer
has a duty to warn of the risks posed by substantially modified prod-
ucts, that duty is still subject to the built-in limitations of traditional
failure-to-warn jurisprudence. Manufacturers have no duty to warn of
open and obvious risks, and a defendant's failure to warn or instruct
about latent risks or risk-avoidance measures must be the proximate
cause of the plaintiffs harm in order for liability to attach. Still, in
hindsight, given the way the Second Circuit ultimately applied the
duty announced by the Court of Appeals, perhaps the New York court
would have been wiser not to rely on another court to apply the tradi-
tional, common-sense limits of the failure-to-warn doctrine. Instead,
the New York Court of Appeals should have answered the second cer-
tified question and applied those limits itself.
B. How the Second Circuit Misapplied the Duty to Instruct in
Liriano III
The Introduction of this Note suggests that maintaining reasona-
ble bounds on a complex area of law requires not only caution in
announcing subtle legal duties, but also care in considering how
courts might apply such duties, as well as circumspection on the part
of the courts actually applying them. Although the New York Court of
Appeals could have taken greater care in placing boundaries on the
duty it announced in Liriano II, the Second Circuit surely could have
been more circumspect in its application of that duty. In its ultimate
contribution to the Liriano litigation, the Second Circuit took the duty
154 See Liriano II, 700 N.E.2d at 308, 309.
155 Id.
1 6 Thus, although a manufacturer cannot warn its way out of a bad design, perhaps it
can design its way out of a failure to warn.
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announced by the New York Court of Appeals and turned it into a
lawless doctrine by stripping it of its built-in limitations. This section
provides a critical analysis of the Second Circuit's application of the
informed-choice duty to instruct, while the next section addresses the
lawless implications of that duty, even if it is "correctly" applied.
1. The Risk-Avoidance Measure Was Obvious
Although the duty to instruct about nonobvious risk-avoidance
measures can be straightforward in certain instances, 15 7 the Second
Circuit's application of it is questionable; the court arguably applied
the duty to instruct to an obvious risk-avoidance measure. The holding
in Liriano III, if validly based on a duty to instruct product users about
nonobvious risk-avoidance measures, unsurprisingly requires that
methods of avoiding the risks of commercial meat grinders be nonob-
vious. Judge Calabresi claimed that it was not obvious "(a) that it is
feasible to reduce the risk with safety guards, (b) that such guards are
made available with the grinders, and (c) that the grinders should be
used only with the guards."1 58 Propositions (a) and (b) can be re-
duced to the proposition that grinders can be used with guards, while
(c) states that they should be so used.
There are at least two problems with characterizing these two pro-
positions as instructions about nonobvious risk-avoidance measures.
First, strictly speaking, informing someone of the fact that meat grind-
ers can be used with safety guards is not an instruction. Instructions
are not merely informative, they are prescriptive-they tell one what
to do. Perhaps, though, a message that meat grinders can be used
with guards might entail an implicit instruction. Perhaps telling the
machine operator that it is possible to use the machine with a safety
guard implicitly instructs the operator to use the machine only with
the guard in place. If that is the case, then propositions (a) through
(c) merge, and state only the following proposition: commercial meat
grinders should not be used without safety guards.
Second, if Hobart's duty was to inform operators that meat grind-
ers should not be used without safety guards, then the risk-avoidance
technique entailed by the use of safety guards is arguably obvious. Al-
though using a meat grinder with a safety guard specifically reduces
the risks of use, the method of risk-avoidance facilitated by the use of
safety guards may be stated more generally-safety guards help opera-
tors effect the risk-avoidance technique of keeping their hands out of
157 Recall the hypothetical in Part II.A.1 in which it might not be obvious that only
certain types of safety glasses would prevent retinal injury. It seems just to hold the manu-
facturer of the dangerous machine to a duty to instruct users about such a nonobvious
safety measure.
158 See Liriano III, 170 F.3d 264, 271 (2d Cir. 1999).
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the grinder. The operative question for the court then becomes
whether it is obvious that one should keep her hands away from the
open mouth of a commercial meat grinder. If such a risk-avoidance
measure is obvious, then the manufacturer of the grinder has neither
a duty to warn of the risks of not doing so nor a duty to instruct on
how to go about it. The truth-value of the antecedent seems clear
enough.
2. Informed Choice Was Inappropriate
Although informed-choice theory may be appropriate when ap-
plied to a certain narrow range of product risks, the Second Circuit's
application of the theory to the dangers of commercial meat grinders
is problematic. First, if, as argued above, the risk-avoidance measure
were obvious-that is, if one obviously ought to take steps to keep
one's hands out of the open mouth of a commercial meat grinder-
then informed choice simply does not apply. In the end, the in-
formed-choice information Hobart had a duty to provide-that one
might want to forgo using a meat grinder that is missing its safety
guard-does not seem to provide any more information to an opera-
tor than the information that the very sight of a guardless grinder
conveys. Whether considering the risks posed by meat grinders or the
methods of avoiding those risks, any information that a warning or
instruction might convey is open and obvious.159
The second problem with the Second Circuit's application of in-
formed choice is more general: even if the methods of avoiding the
risks of commercial meat grinders are not obvious, meat grinders are
not the sort of product that informed choice can appropriately ad-
dress. Although courts have long recognized the duty to provide in-
structions or warnings for the purpose of facilitating informed
decisions, 6 1 they have narrowly circumscribed the duty's application.
Courts invoke informed choice "almost exclusively with regard to
those toxic agents and. pharmaceutical products with respect to which
courts have recognized a distinctive need to provide risk information
so that recipients of the information can decide whether they wish to
159 Thus, Bowbeer and Killoran are correct when they argue that the Second Circuit
imposed a duty on Hobart to provide information regarding a risk that "was neither latent
nor unavoidable." Bowbeer & Killoran, supra note 4, at 749.
160 See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1103 (5th Cir.
1973) (holding asbestos manufacturers liable for failing to instruct installers of the danger
inherent in exposure to the product); Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 131 (9th
Cir. 1968) (reversing the trial court on its failure to instruct that the manufacture of a
vaccine was strictly liable for harm that it failed to inform users about).
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purchase or utilize the product. '16 1 Few courts have applied in-
formed-choice theory to other kinds of products.
162
There is good reason to hesitate in applying informed choice to a
wide range of products. Informed choice is most appropriately in-
voked when otherwise beneficial products carry significant, irreduci-
ble risks. Certain products, such as pharmaceuticals, may at once be
both highly beneficial and potentially quite dangerous. For example,
if the only way to prevent a crippling disease is to take a particular
vaccine, one is unlikely to refuse it. However, if the vaccine simultane-
ously posed a significant risk of causing a different but equally
debilitating disease, one would likely want to know that fact in order
to make a fully informed decision whether the vaccine's benefit out-
weighs its risk.1
63
When products present a relatively limited class of readily identi-
fiable benefits and risks that cannot be easily affected by the user or
consumer, it might be reasonable to require manufacturers to provide
informed-choice information. However, in the case of "product risks
in which the product-user relationship is more complex,1 64 informed
choice is less appropriate. For example, products such as automobiles
and industrial machinery may pose innumerable risks to users. Im-
portantly, some of these risks may arise as the result of product misuse
or alteration. Someone might, for example, chisel the safety guard off
of a commercial meat grinder. It would likely be useless to require
the manufacturers of such products to supply warnings and instruc-
tions that anticipate every conceivable instance in which a product
user might face an informed-choice moment of decision. Providing
innumerable informed-choice warnings and instructions for risks that
may or may not arise "would add little, if anything, to true informed
choice." 165 The volume, complexity, and potential inconsistency of
such information would likely create a cognitive overload rather than
facilitate clear, informed decision making. Indeed, the notion of be-
ing "fully informed" is a slippery one. One can always imagine addi-
tional risks that a complex product might pose. It is questionable,
however, whether users of such products would be better or worse
equipped to make dignified choices if product manufacturers were to
161 RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 2 cmt. i.
162 But see Watkins v. Ford Motor Co., 190 F.3d 1213, 1219 (11th Cir. 1999) (applying
informed-choice theory to the manufacturer of a sports utility vehicle that had a propensity
to roll over).
163 Cf Davis, 399 F.2d at 129-30 (holding that the manufacturer of a polio vaccine had
a duty to warn of the risk of death or major disability that necessarily accompanied use of
the vaccine).




provide them with an infinitely expanding universe of information re-
garding unlikely potentialities.
3. The Court Improperly Avoided Causation Analysis
The Second Circuit's misapplication of informed-choice theory
also undermines its causation analysis. Causation may rightly play a
less important role in genuine informed-choice cases. 166 However, if
Liriano III were not a proper informed-choice case, then the court
should have considered causation a paramount concern. As the Intro-
duction suggests, when intellectually capable courts announce subtle
duties and then apply them to actual defendants, such courts can still
place sensible, practical limits on those duties by taking seriously their
ability to decide questions of proximate causation as a matter of law.
In Liriano III, however, the Second Circuit adopted the functional
equivalent of a heeding presumption by failing to require the plaintiff
to present evidence of causation to establish his prima facie case. 1" 7
That is, the plaintiff did not have to produce evidence that he would
have acted differently had Hobart provided a warning. 168  Even
though it is not entirely clear that the Second Circuit has condoned
heeding presumptions in failure-to-warn cases either before16 1 or af-
ter 17 0 this case, the Liriano III court abrogated its own power to decide
causation as a matter of law.
A number of courts and commentators have expressed doubt as
to the utility of adopting a heeding presumption in failure-to-warn
cases.17 1 Henderson and Twerski illustrated the competing considera-
tions as follows: "A plaintiff typically can offer little more than self-
serving testimony and anecdotal evidence to establish her proximate
causation case .... If courts were to 'get tough' with plaintiffs on the
166 See supra Part I.A.2.
167 See Liriano III, 170 F.3d 264, 271 (2d Cir. 1999) ("When a defendant's negligent act
is deemed wrongful precisely because it has a strong propensity to cause the type of injury
that ensued, the very causal tendency is evidence enough to establish a primafacie case of
cause-in-fact."). See generally HENDERSON & TWERSKI, supra note 21, at 425-26 ("The trend
in favor of applying a 'heeding presumption' in causation cases is substantial."); Sales,
supra note 27, at 549 (noting that the heeding presumption shifts the burden to the manu-
facturer to show that a warning would not have prevented the plaintiff's injury).
168 See Liriano II, 170 F.3d at 271.
169 See, e.g., Raney v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 897 F.2d 94, 96 (2d Cir. 1990) (permitting an
inference of causation, but not applying a causation presumption).
170 See, e.g., Walsh v. Hayward Indus. Prods., 2001 WL 303754, at *1 (2d Cir. Mar. 28,
2001) (applying New York law and affirming summary judgment for the manufacturer of a
valve used at a waste-water facility, the court held that "[a]s to his claim for failure to warn,
Walsh failed to produce evidence that the valves were dangerous as manufactured, or that a
warning would have prevented his injury" (emphasis added)).
171 See, e.g., Bowbeer et al., supra note 27, at 460-63 (surveying criticisms of the pre-
sumption); Reynolds & Kirschman, supra note 27, at 577-78 (arguing that it is incorrect to
suggest that a heeding presumption can relieve a plaintiff from having to prove causation).
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causation issue, almost no one would survive a defendant's motion for
summary disposition." 172 On the other hand, "anything less than get-
ting tough sends most causation issues to the jury.' ' 173 The authors
conclude that
[i]n failure-to-warn cases, causation analysis is already a flight into
fancy. When a presumption favors the plaintiff, the defendant is
basically precluded from the opportunity to convince a court to rule
as a matter of law that the failure to warn was not the proximate
cause of plaintiffs harm. 174
When courts adopt heeding presumptions, defendants are left to at-
tempt to rebut the presumption by putting on evidence that the plain-
tiff actually knew of the danger, 175 habitually ignored warnings, or was
intellectually incapable of heeding a reasonable instruction or warn-
ing. However, defendants are likely to avoid these latter tactics, not
wanting to risk alienating the jury with a personal attack on the plain-
tiff as "lazy" or "dull-witted."'176 Thus, defendants are left with little
ability to argue that there was no causation. Causation is critical to the
fair determination of liability. Therefore, courts would be wise to
leave the burden of proving causation on failure-to-warn plaintiffs.
If the Second Circuit had not abrogated its own power to decide
proximate cause as a matter of law, it might have been able to ex-
amine a few important questions. For example, is it really the case
that the fact that meat grinders can and should be used with guards
was not obvious or known to Liriano? After all, Liriano had worked
with meat grinders before. 177 Moreover, the guard on the machine
that injured Liriano had been chiseled off.' 78 Further, would Liriano
really have altered his behavior had there been a warning or instruc-
tion on the grinder? Liriano was arguably at the mercy of his em-
ployer; he was seventeen years old, had only recently immigrated to
this country, and had been on the job for just one week.' 79 If Hobart
somehow had conveyed to Liriano that he had a "true choice"-that
he could decide not to expose himself to the dangers of guardless
meat grinders-is it plausible that Liriano would have been suffi-
ciently emboldened to tell Super that he was going to exercise that
choice? 180 Even if the dangers of using guardless meat grinders and
172 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 8, at 305-06.
173 Id. at 306.
174 Id. at 325.
'75 See, e.g., Arnold v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 834 S.W.2d 192, 194-96 (Mo. 1992) (address-
ing the plaintiffs knowledge as a "contributory fault" issue).
176 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 8, at 306.
177 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
178 See supra notes 42, 44 and accompanying text.
179 See Liriano III, 170 F.3d 264, 269 (2d Cir. 1999).
18o At least one commentator has expressed a similar skepticism, suggesting that "the
court's talk of informed choice and plaintiff's asking his employer to replace the guard is
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the way to avoid those dangers are not obvious, it is worth asking
whether the absence of a corresponding warning or instruction really
was a but-for cause of Liriano's injuries.
C. Why the Informed-Choice Duty to Instruct Has Unacceptable
Practical Implications
Although the Second Circuit may have incorrectly or improvi-
dently applied the duty to instruct in Liriano III, the duty created by
the joint efforts of the New York Court of Appeals and the Second
Circuit may be problematic even if applied "correctly." That is, even if
courts were to restrict themselves to holding product manufacturers
liable for providing inadequate instructions regarding genuinely non-
obvious risk-avoidance measures, and did so in the name of informed
choice, they would risk undermining reasonable, practical constraints
on liability. Although Liriano IIIdoes not formally violate the letter of
failure-to-warn doctrine, the duty it entails functionally violates the
doctrine's spirit. The Second Circuit, armed with the substantial-mod-
ification duty to warn, effectively set forth a practical guide to avoiding
both the open and obvious danger rule and any meaningful causation
analysis, and, moreover, in Burke suggested that any well-pleaded fail-
ure-to-warn case might now reach ajury.l8 t Furthermore, in establish-
ing a doctrine without effective judicial constraints, the court created
a warnings regime in which the rate of product-related accidents may
actually increase.
182
1. Nearly Every (Well-Pleaded) Failure-to-Warn Claim Can Reach the
Jury
Judge Calabresi implicitly cast Liriano III not as a "warning" case,
but rather as an "instruction" case. 183 While this characterization, on
the right facts, could allow the court to formally respect the open and
obvious danger rule, it can also enable the court to functionally ig-
nore that rule. Although Bowbeer and Killoran occasionally misiden-
tify precisely what the court was doing in Liriano 111,184 they rightly
argue that "the court should have considered the far-reaching effects
of imposing a virtually limitless duty to warn.., in the face of an open
and obvious danger."' 85 In any case involving an open and obvious
largely symbolic, invoked in an attempt to justify the court's imposition on the manufac-
turer of what amounts to thinly veiled strict liability." James A. Henderson, Jr., Echoes of
Enterprise Liability in Product Design and Marketing Litigation, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 958, 993
(2002) (footnote omitted).
181 See Burke v. Spartanics Ltd., 252 F.3d 131, 137-40 (2d Cir. 2001); infra Part IIl.C.1.
182 See infra notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
183 See supra Part II.C.1.
184 See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
185 Bowbeer & Killoran, supra note 4, at 737 (emphasis added).
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danger, one can conceive of a way in which the defendant could have
instructed the plaintiff on a latent risk-avoidance measure. Professors
Henderson and Twerski have suggested that there are two ways in
which courts avoid holding that a danger was obvious as a matter of
law. First, some "courts label an arguably obvious risk as non-obvious
simply to allow a plaintiff whose design-defect claim has failed a
chance to recover on a warning claim." 18 6 Second, courts sometimes
"improperly characterize obvious risks as non-obvious ... when [they]
reason by hindsight."' 8 7 Judge Calabresi has now created a third way
of side-stepping the open and obvious danger rule: a court can im-
pose liability in the face of an open and obvious danger by creatively
finding a nonobvious risk-avoidance measure on which to hang the
hat of duty.1 88
In addition to showing courts how to manipulate the duty-axis of
failure to warn-by shifting from a duty to warn to a duty to instruct,
thereby avoiding the open and obvious danger rule-Liriano III also
illustrates how courts might circumvent causation analysis by manipu-
lating the purpose-axis of failure to warn. By invoking an informed-
choice rationale rather than risk-reduction, courts can shift their focus
from causation to concern for the plaintiff's dignity-with the focus
not on an instruction or warning that would have altered the plain-
tiffs conduct, but rather one that would have given the plaintiff the
opportunity to choose whether to alter her conduct. Thus, even if in-
forming a plaintiff of a latent risk-avoidance measure would not have
actually reduced the risk of harm, failure-to-warn plaintiffs are not
without hope in the Second Circuit. After all, the. court will not only
freely impose a duty to instruct on latent risk-avoidance measures, it
will do so in the name of informed-choice decision making.
Thus, in nearly every case in which a product harms someone
there is a strategy by which the plaintiff can reach the jury. First, the
plaintiff should be sure to assert both design and warning claims. If
the product has been substantially modified post-sale, the warning
claim will likely survive even if the design claim does not.189 Second, if
the product posed an obvious danger, the plaintiff should claim the
manufacturer failed to provide an instruction. As long as the plaintiff
can suggest a nonobvious risk-avoidance measure, the claim may very
well reach the jury. Third, if the instruction would have done no
good-if it would not have allowed the plaintiff to reduce her expo-
sure to the risk, and even if it counsels her to do something she would
not have done anyway-the plaintiff can argue that it was her dignity
186 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 8, at 314.
187 Id. at 315.
188 See Liriano I1, 170 F.3d 264, 270-71 (2d Cir. 1999).
189 See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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that suffered. In Burke, the Second Circuit actually suggested how a
plaintiff might creatively utilize Liriano III.
At oral argument, Burke made clear that his contention is that Spar-
tanics should have placed a warning, at the rear approach to the
machine, about the dangers of placing one's hand in the cutting
plane. His argument was expressly not that Spartanics should have
warned that the (perhaps obvious) dangers associated with access to
the machine from the back could be obviated by use of the original
conveyor system, and that the machine should not be used without
that conveyor system. Nor was this latter argument, an analogue to
that upheld in Liriano III, put forward below. Accordingly, Liriano
III is of no benefit to plaintiff .... l 1o
Therefore, even if a plaintiff is harmed by an obvious danger, she
need only plead the case in such a manner as to invoke the Liriano III
rule. Perhaps if counsel for Alphonso Burke had been theoretically
sophisticated enough to ask for an informed-choice instruction, Burke
would have succeeded in his claim against Spartanics. 19 1
2. The Costs of Preventing Claims from Reaching the Jury Are
Significant
Although Liriano III has created a doctrine under which plaintiffs
may nearly always reach a jury, manufacturers can nonetheless take
steps to avoid risking liability. However, the remedy might be worse
than the disease. Bowbeer and Killoran argue that Liriano III sends a
message to manufacturers that they had better include warnings on
their products that are relevant to every conceivable alteration or mis-
use of those products.19 2 Indeed, manufacturers would be wise to go
further. They should consider including not only warnings relevant to
possible alterations of their products, but also instructions explaining
how the product should be used if one of those alterations occurs.
These warnings and instructions should cover not merely information
that a foreseeable user would need to enable her to use the product
safely, but also information concerning one-in-a-million risks, or risk-
avoidance measures that the user could not in reality implement. But
what would result from such a warnings regime? Would it reduce the
aggregate harm caused by product use?
19o Burke v. Spartanics Ltd., 252 F.3d 131, 137-38 (2d Cir. 2001).
191 Had Burke pleaded his case in this manner, he would have been correct in arguing
that the jury instruction misstated the manufacturer's duty. The instruction stated that
Spartanics had "no duty to warn" so long as the "dangers associated with the machine were
obvious." Id. at 137. However, under a regime that recognizes informed-choice duties to
instruct, Spartanics might still owe a duty to instruct about ways to avoid even an obvious
danger, regardless of how unlikely it is that the product user could or would carry them
out.
192 See Bowbeer & Killoran, supra note 4, at 736-47.
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An important reason not to require manufacturers and distribu-
tors to warn of open and obvious risks is that ovenwarning can actually
decrease the effectiveness of warnings. 193 Overwarning effectively
amounts to the manufacturer "crying wolf."194 The more that product
manufacturers warn of risks that never materialize, the less likely prod-
uct users are to heed those warnings. If product users merely ignored
the excessive warnings, the problem might be minimal-the only su-
perfluous costs would be those of providing the warnings. However,
product users might begin to ignore not only the excessive warnings,
but also those that are crucial to safe product use. As warning labels
become increasingly crowded with seemingly redundant, useless ad-
monitions to avoid subjecting oneself to obvious risks, product users
and consumers may increasingly view all warnings as similarly useless,
even those that advise of nonobvious risks. Indeed, the New York
Court of Appeals counsels that "[r] equiring too many warnings trivial-
izes and undermines the entire purpose of the rule, drowning out cau-
tions against latent dangers of which a user might not otherwise be
aware." 195 The resultant increase in inattentiveness to valid warnings
would contravene the intentions of a rigorous warnings regime. 196
Imposing a duty to instruct that serves informed-choice decision mak-
ing, effectively abrogating existing rules of obviousness and causation,
may allow courts to compensate accident victims more often, but at a
cost.
If overwarning does, in fact, result in the "crowding out" of useful
information, then a regime that encourages manufacturers to
overwarn and overinstruct in order to avoid liability will be a regime in
which accident rates might actually increase. A self-defeating doctrine
would emerge, with courts causing an increase in product-related
harm by insisting on an increase in warnings and instructions about
those harms. Alternatively, if courts resist the temptation to play fast
and loose with failure-to-warn theory, and restrict failure to warn to a
sensible risk-reduction duty to warn or instruct by retaining common-
193 SeeJames A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, The Products Liability Restatement in
the Courts: An Initial Assessment, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 7, 16 (2000) ("The obviousness of
the danger is the surrogate for a warning and warnings about obvious and well known risks
diminish the significance of warnings and tend to clutter warning labels with useless infor-
mation."); see also Henderson & Twerski, supra note 8, at 296-303 (arguing, from the per-
spective of risk-utility balancing, that the social cost of warning consumers about obvious
risks-a cost that may include an increase in the rate of product-related accidents-may
well outweigh the putative benefits of such warnings).
194 See Twerski et al., supra note 19, at 514.
195 Liriano II, 700 N.E.2d 303, 308 (N.Y. 1998).
196 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 2 cmt. j ("[W]arnings that deal with obvious or
generally known risks may be ignored by users and consumers and may diminish the signif-
icance of warnings about non-obvious, not-generally-known risks. Thus, requiring warn-
ings of obvious or generally known risks could reduce the efficacy of warnings generally.").
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sense notions of obviousness and .causation, they might more effec-
tively "reduce the sum of the costs of accidents and the costs of avoid-
ing accidents."'1 97 Of course, accidents will occur. However, they
might actually occur less often if courts required warnings only in situ-
ations in which reasonable users and consumers would both need and
heed them.
CONCLUSION
The products liability doctrine of failure to warn is grounded in a
duty to inform product users and consumers of nonobvious risks and
risk-avoidance measures related to product use or consumption.
Product manufacturers and distributors can convey information via
instructions or warnings, thus helping users and consumers either
know how to use or consume more safely, or decide whether they wish
to use or consume at all. While Liriano Ill first appears to violate the
rule that there is no duty to warn of obvious dangers, upon closer
inspection it emerges as an instance of one of the four possible combi-
nations of failure-to-warn duty and purpose-the court imposed an
informed-choice duty to instruct on nonobvious risk-avoidance
measures.
Even though the New York Court of Appeals and the Second Cir-
cuit jointly announced a theoretically coherent duty in Liriano II and
III, both its specific application to Hobart and its general practical
implications are unacceptable. The risk-avoidance information that
the Second Circuit held Hobart had a duty to provide was arguably
obvious and was an inappropriate object of informed choice. Further,
even if "correctly" applied, a substantial-modification, informed-
choice duty to instruct runs the risk of turning product manufacturers
into insurers, enabling courts to send nearly every failure-to-warn
claim to the jury. Such a permissive warnings regime encourages
product manufacturers to provide users and consumers with excessive
and useless information, a practice that could actually result in in-
creased accident costs.. To keep practical limits on failure to warn,
courts would be wise to take seriously the open and obvious danger
rule, the effective limits of informed choice, and the need for sound,
reasonable causation analysis. If they do not, they risk creating a self-
contradictory doctrine under which manufacturers must choose be-
tween underwarning, thus risking liability by not providing informa-
tion on every conceivable product-related risk, and overwarning, thus
possibly increasing the rate of product-related accidents, albeit acci-
dents for which they will not be liable.
197 GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 26 (1970).
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